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the plaintiff did not follow the procedural requirements for enforcement by the German courts; 224 he therefore contended that the New
York courts could not confirm the award since it was inconclusive in
New York within the meaning of the treaty.
Judge Stecher reasoned that a treaty has the same effect on the
common law as a federal statute; therefore, there is no presumption
that it preempts the laws of the state unless its language expressly
or impliedly mandates that result. In the court's view, the treaty in
question merely set forth the minimum standards for confirmation of
foreign awards. In other words, awards meeting the treaty terms must
be confirmed. However, as indicated, the common law remains intact,
and under New York law, foreign awards, like foreign judgments, are
recognized and deemed conclusive unless the foreign tribunal lacked
jurisdiction of the person or the subject matter, or a fraud was perpetrated on the court.225 In the absence of proof of any of these three

defects the Engelbrechten court ordered enforcement of the award. 220
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAw

DRL § 81: Mother liable in part for counsel fees arising from habeas
corpus proceeding brought to determine child's custody.
DRL section 81 decrees that "[a] married woman is a joint guardian of her children with her husband, with equal powers, rights and
duties in regard to them." 227 However, this statutory prescription fails
to specify what "powers, rights and duties" it is intended to encompass.
For instance, can a mother ever have a "duty" to pay counsel fees incurred in her child's behalf in light of the fact that an expense of that
nature is a necessary? 228 The DRL seemingly suggests that this question
should be answered in the negative. For, sections 237 and 240 of the
tDRL, dealing with counsel fees and expenses, and custody and maintenance of children, respectively, expressly provide for payment of
224 It was contended that the plaintiff could not obtain execution in Germany until:
(1) a court had certified the award, and (2) the defendant had an opportunity to file objections.
225 See 8 WK&M
7510.15 (1968).
226 The court granted a sixty-day stay to enable the defendant to protest the award
before the German courts. Cf. In re Overseas Distrib., 5 App. Div. 2d 498, 499, 173
N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (1st Dep't 1958), where the court stated: "We recognize that an award
may be deemed to be final if all that remains to be done are ministerial acts or arithmetical calculations."
227 Dom. REL. LAW § 81 (McKinney 1964).
228 Friou v. Gentes, 11 App. Div. 2d 124, 126, 204 N.YS.2d 836, 838 (2d Dep't 1960):
"Legal services rendered for a wife or child are necessaries."; Gutterman v. Langerman,
2 App. Div. 2d 63, 153 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1st Dep't 1956).
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these costs "by a husband or father" or "to the wife"; but no mention
is made of payment by a wife as mother or to a husband.
In 1961, however, the Joint Legislative Committee on Matrimonial and Family Laws stated that, at least with respect to DRL section 237, a court with discretion could "order a wife who has failed
to prove her case to repay a counsel fee.' 229 This statement has now
received judicial approval from the County Court of Westchester
County in Erico v. Manville,230 wherein an attorney sought to recover
from an infant's mother a judgment for legal services rendered in the
child's behalf.
In 1959 the child's parents had entered into a separation agreement, pursuant to which custody of the infant was awarded to the
father and the mother agreed to pay him $150 per month as support,
plus a proportionate share of the child's necessary educational expenses.
Shortly after the separation agreement was entered into, the mother
married the allegedly wealthy Thomas F. Manville. This latter revelation accounts for the somewhat unusual aspects of the aforementioned
financial arrangement between the parents.
Some eight years later, and after the death of Mr. Manville, the
mother instituted a habeas corpus proceeding to obtain custody of
her daughter. In that action the father employed an attorney to oppose
the mother, and in addition, requested the court to increase the support to $500 per month and to order the mother to pay the counsel fees
incurred as a result of the proceeding. The court denied both the
mother's application for custody and the cross-relief sought by the
father. As to the latter, the court noted that it was powerless to grant
the relief requested because neither section 237 nor section 240 of the
DRL provided for payments other than those by a husband or father. 231
As indicated previously, the attorney opposing the mother in the
habeas corpus proceeding initiated the instant action to recover
his fees. The mother impleaded the father, theorizing that if she were
found liable to the plaintiff the father would in turn be liable to her
for the full amount of the judgment.
Disposing of the res judicata issue raised by the mother, 232 the
220 REPORT Or THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COSmrrTEE ON MATRIMONIAL AND FAMILY LAWS,

1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 19 at 81.
230 59 Misc. 2d 549, 299 N.YS.2d 914 (Westchester County Ct. 1969).
231 A portion of the opinion in the habeas corpus proceeding appears in 59 Misc. 2d
at 551, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
232 The court held that the habeas corpus determination regarding counsel fees was
not res judicata on the question whether the attorney could recover his fee in a separate
action against the mother. 59 Misc. 2d at 551-52, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
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court immediately recognized that the legal services rendered were
necessaries performed on the infant's behalf since a habeas corpus proceeding of this nature is a determination solely for the child's best
interests and welfare. Furthermore, the court held that DRL sections
237 and 240 did not provide the exclusive remedy for recovery of the
costs of necessaries. DRL section 81 provides support for the proposition that a mother may be liable for a child's necessaries in the same
manner a father is. Other factors peculiar to this case also necessitated
this result: the father earned little more than $5,000 per year as a
barber; the mother, however, received investment income in excess
of $12,000 per year and stood to receive more if Mr. Manville's will
was admitted to probate; the separation agreement evidenced a recognition on the mother's part that she, rather than her ex-husband, was
liable for most of the child's support, and the plaintiff had relied upon
this when he consented to represent the child in the habeas corpus
proceeding.
Although the plaintiff would normally have been entitled to recover from both parents, his judgment was limited to the mother since
she was the only one he had served in the action. Nevertheless, the
mother. was entitled to contribution of five-seventeenths of the judgment from her ex-husband, an amount determined by the ratio of his
annual income to the annual income of both parents.
With this decision the court has arrived at an equitable solution
to a unique set of circumstances for which the legislature purposefully
233
chose not to provide.
DRL § 211: Conflict over applicationsfor temporary alimony continues.
The "cooling-off" statute of the DRL, section 211, has permitted
plaintiffs to serve a petition to the court for temporary alimony and
counsel fees in conjunction with a summons since 1968. This seemingly
innocuous provision has generated some sharp conflict among the lower
courts in the state. Since DRL section 215-e permits a party to a conciliation proceeding to apply directly to the conciliation commissioner
for temporary alimony, the courts have divided on the question of
which section should normally be controlling. In short, if a court
233 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 19 at 83-84:

While the bill treats primarily of wives and their rights against husbands for
the awards described, it is also of moment what should be done with reference to
the husband who is without funds or support or who appears better qualified to
care for children, particularly in those cases where there is a wide disparity in
personal wealth in favor of the wife. For the time, however, if we consider that
wives still are considered the natural custodian of minor children, particularly
girls, there is virtue in the presently proposed bill.

